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ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO LOCAL ZONING AND
OTHER LAND USE CONTROLS
STUART L. DEUTSCH*

Especially for lawyers who have concentrated on the areas of law
traditionally relevant to local government practice, the last few years
have been a shock because of the reduction in the local government
exemption against antitrust attacks, and because of the appearance of
many antitrust cases filed against local governments.
For many lawyers, antitrust law has an almost mystical quality. It
involves economics and charts and graphs and division of markets and
all sorts of things that most lawyers are not very comfortable doing.
With trebled damages, judgments are sometimes in the hundreds of
millions of dollars, and can even reach the billions, as in the case involving the MCI judgment against American Telephone and Telegraph Company.' Although the 1.8 billion dollar MCI judgment has
been reversed, 2 even much smaller antitrust recoveries can present impressive numbers especially for a city with 10,000 or 100,000 or even
3,000,000 residents.
From the viewpoint of a defendant city and its attorney, it is terrifying to be confronted with potential liability of any significant amount
from a new area of law. Probably more important than the possible
liability, which is unlikely to occur in the land use regulation area and
which this article will argue should only rarely occur, 3 is the potentially
substantial cost of defending an antitrust action. Defending antitrust
suits can cost a city thousands of dollars per month in legal fees and
costs. 4 Paying large defense costs can be devastating to a city's budget,
even assuming a successful ultimate outcome.
Another reason why city officials are upset is that people occasion* B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Yale University; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law and Co-Director, Program on Energy and the Environment, lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
2. Id.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
4. For example, the City of Richmond spent about $800,000 in legal fees in the first sixteen
asf-its defense ofRichmond Hilto'n Assoc. v. City of'Richmond 81-1 100R (E.D. Va. 1981),
nffils
an average of $50,000 per month. See 5 NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1, 20 (1983). See 690 F.2d 1086
(8th Cir. 1982) and Hanky v. City of Richmond, 532 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1982) for collateral
opinions in this lawsuit.
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ally go to jail for antitrust violations. Of course, in the Chicago area
and elsewhere, local government officials sometimes go to jail for lots
of reasons. But who needs another risk of that sort?
From the plaintiff's point of view the antitrust law is mystical for
opposite reasons. An antitrust victory offers glory to both the attorney
and the successful plaintiff. For the attorney it offers a chance for a
high percentage fee of a large recovery. For the potential developer,
the threat of an antitrust suit offers enormous leverage with a once arrogant and uncooperative local government, now cringing and cowering before the applicant's onslaught. If the applicant's attorney
threatens to sue in antitrust, the local government might even let the
client do what she wants to do: get rezoning to build an office building
or a shopping center, open a bar, get a franchise or a city contract.
To analyze the antitrust law changes as they affect local governments, this article is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the
sharp reduction in the state action exemption from the antitrust laws
for local government units. The second part of the article is an analysis
of the zoning and land use related antitrust suits which have been or
are presently in litigation. The third part of the article will argue that
local governments should only rarely be found liable under the antitrust laws as a result of land use regulation, either when the municipality is acting as a developer or when the actions of the municipality are
taken for the benefit of government officials or particular individuals,
rather than taken for the health, safety or general welfare of the community. The usual treble damages remedy for antitrust liability against
local governments should only be assessed when punitive damages are
justified because the local government is acting for the benefit of government officials or particular individuals.
PART I

Reduction of the Antitrust Exemption
In order to explore the present day erosion of the antitrust exemption for local governments, it is necessary to analyze Parker v. Brown,the United States Supreme Court decision which established the state
action exemption.
In Parker,the Supreme Court announced the state government action exemption from the antitrust'laws. Mvoe, specifically; the Siuplrdtie
Court held that a legislative command from a state legislature was not
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

-
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covered by the Sherman Act, even if it commanded private parties as
well as public officials to act, and even if the action would have been
illegal if carried out by the private parties acting alone. 6 The court held
that the Sherman Act would not be interpreted to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents, or to prevent official action directed by
the state. However, a state cannot give antitrust immunity to private
parties by declaring their acts to be lawful. 7 In the only reference to
local governments, the Court stated that its analysis does not decide the
question of "the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a
private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade." 8
Thus, Parker v. Brown established that there is not complete immunity from the antitrust laws for cities if there is municipal participation in a private agreement. Nothing in Parker explicitly exempted
local governments from the antitrust laws, although the courts for
many years acted as if there had been such an explicit exemption.
After three decades of not dealing with the issue, during the 1970's
the United States Supreme Court began to look at and narrow the state
action exemption that arose with Parker. The initial cases dealt with
the actions of state agents. For example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,9 the Supreme Court held that the state bar could not enforce a
county bar association minimum fee schedule. The "classic price fixing" established in the fee schedule was held not to be exempt because
fee setting actions were not directed by the state acting as a sovereign.
In Cantor v. DetroitEdison Company,'0 a private utility furnishing light
bulbs under the rate schedule adopted by the Michigan Public Service
Commission was not exempt under the antitrust laws despite the strong
state involvement with the light bulb service of the private utility. On
the other hand, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, I the anti-advertising
rules of the Arizona State Bar were voided on free speech grounds but
were found not to be attackable under the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court held that the state constitution specifically authorized disciplinary rules and made the Arizona Supreme Court "the ultimate body
wielding the State's power over the practice of law."' 2 Thus the advertising rules were established directly by the state and fit within the exemption for state action.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 350-52.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 351-52.
421 U.S. 773 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1976).
428 U.S. 579 (1976).
433 U.S. 350 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
Id. at 360.
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The net impact of these cases was to continue the existence of a
state action exemption from the antitrust laws, but to narrow its scope
regarding agencies not clearly part of the main core of state government. The state legislature and state supreme court are clearly part of
that core, but not just anyone with a state label can qualify for the
exemption. In dicta only did these opinions define the application of
the antitrust exemption for cities.
Thus, while unpleasant for cities, the Court was not inconsistent
with previous decisions when it decided City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Light and Power Company13 in 1978. In Lafayette, five members of the
Court voted to find that the antitrust exemption did not apply to the
particular situation concerning the activities of a city owned utility
company. The Court stated that the antitrust laws could in fact apply
to many situations concerning local governments. Although there is no
majority opinion for much of the decision, in the part of the opinion
where there is a majority, the Court found that the term "persons" in
the antitrust laws embraces cities and states.' 4 The antitrust laws apply
to municipalities unless there is an overriding public policy which negates such application. The Supreme Court in effect established a presumption that local governments will be subject to the antitrust laws.
One must find a specific policy to negate the coverage.
Further, finding that Congress intended antitrust laws to be comprehensive, the Court found that there is a presumption against any
exemption or override of the antitrust laws except in three situations:
where there is explicit language to the contrary in the statutes of Congress, where the Noerr-Pennington doctrine comes into play 15 and
where the Parker v. Brown exemption is applicable. 16
However, the Lafayette Court did not read the decision in Parker
expansively. The Court found that it is not anomalous to apply federal
laws to local governments, even those federal laws with criminal or
civil penalties.' 7 The Court found that the antitrust laws are intended
to protect the public from all abuses of economic power, and stated that
13. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
14. Id. at 395.
15. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1968); United Mineworkers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The Noerr-Penningion doctrine holds that "regardless of anticompetitive purpose or intent, a concerted effort by
persons to influence lawmakers to enact legislation beneficial to themselves or detrimental to competitors was not within the scope of the antitrust laws." City of Lafayette v. Lousiana Light &
Power Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978).
16. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
17. 435 U.S. at 400-01. However, the court declined to hold that traditional antitrust remedies would necessarily be appropriate against municipalities. Id. at 402.
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"economic choices made by public corporations in the conduct of their
business affairs. . are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are those of private corporation. . .. -,8 Moreover, the Court rejected any argument
that the political process governs and controls the acts of cities and,
therefore, the antitrust laws should not apply.' 9 The Court expressed
doubt that the political process genuinely can work to protect injured
people, especially those who come from outside the city and may be
affected by the city's anti-competitive activity.
For the majority in Lafayette, the most important factor influencing its decision was the policy of Congress to mandate competition as
the "polestar by which all must be guided in ordering their business
affairs."' 20 For the Supreme Court, competition is the economic order
of the United States. Local governments are seen by the Court as participating in and affecting the economic life of the United States, as
fully capable of aggrandizing and injuring other economic units with
which they interrelate, and as having a potential of seriously distorting
the rational and efficient allocation of resources. 2' A critical concern of
the Court was that "[i]f municipalities were free to make economic
choices counselled solely by their own parochial interests and without
regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in the armor of
antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with the comprehensive national policy Congress established. ' 22 Thus, for the Supreme
Court majority, a local government is merely another economic actor
with no special status, likely to act as badly, unfairly and illegally as
any private entity regulated by the antitrust laws.
The remainder of the Lafayette opinion is a plurality opinion,
worth reviewing because its test has been followed in later cases. 23 The
plurality opinion rejected any city exemption based on the fact that the
city has the status of being a government entity or state subdivision.
Instead, the opinion created a test which requires that the city's conduct
be an act of government by the state as a sovereign, or an act of a state
18. Id. at 403.
19. The Supreme Court has accepted arguments that local political processes show a devotion to democracy and should be presumed capable of protecting the public interest and private
interests. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (rezoning to allow subsidized housing subject to referendum); and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (city
charter provision requiring 55% affirmative vote to approve rezoning of land).
20. 435 U.S. at 406.
21. Id. at 408.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum Co., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
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subdivision. Also, the conduct must be pursuant to a state policy to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service. Finally, the city's actions must have been directed by the state; municipal
preferences are not sufficient to provide an exemption. Indeed, the
opinion hints that a neutral state policy will not be enough to protect a
city's activities. This latter idea is the key to Community Communica25
24
tions Company v. City of Boulder, as will soon be analyzed.
Although state direction is needed, the plurality opinion in Lafayette does say that a specific detailed legislative authorization is not
needed. Instead, legislative authority to operate in an area is needed,
and evidence that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of has to be provided. Thus, while state direction is needed, a
detailed state code is not required for the city to be exempt from anti26
trust laws.
In 1982, the Court showed that it was serious about extending antitrust coverage to local governments despite the split nature of the Lafayette opinion. 27 Boulder is a home rule city operating under an extensive constitutional grant of home rule power from the Colorado
Constitution. In Community CommunicationsCompany v. City of Boulder 28 the city was sued by its cable TV franchisee for imposing a three
month moratorium on any extension of the cable system. During the
three month period the city expected to consider a new cable TV policy
and whether to invite competitive bidding for extending cable service
to the rest of the city. The moratorium was defended by the city on the
grounds that expansion by the plaintiff during the planning period
would reduce the possibility of competitive bidding in unserved areas
29
of Boulder.
The majority held that Boulder's moratorium was subject to attack
under the antitrust laws. It found that the Lafayette test, as it had been
developed through other cases, 30 meant that for a city to be exempt
from the antitrust laws the anti-competitive practices must constitute
either the acts of a state itself in its sovereign capacity or acts of the
municipality to further or implement a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. 3' The Court held that a general grant of
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29,
30.
31.

455 U.S. 40 (1982).
See infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
435 U.S. at 415.
See Community Communications Company v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 45-46.
See supra note 23.
Further, there may be a second part of the test, that the municipality's acts must be sub-
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home rule power, while authorizing cable TV regulation by Boulder,
did not make the Boulder actions the act of the state as a sovereign.
In addition, a general grant of home rule power does not satisfy
the "clear articulation and affirmative expression" of policy required
for exemption. 32 According to the Court in City of Boulder, it could not
be inferred from the legislative history or the constitutional language
that Colorado contemplated that Boulder would take anti-competitive
action. Nor was it clear that the state expected that the city would act
in an anti-competitive way. Moreover, the state did not command the
city to act in an anti-competitive way. The Court found that the Colorado Constitution was neutral on the activities of the City of Boulder
and certainly had not mandated such activities. The result of such neutrality was that the shield of antitrust exemption would not be available
because pro-competitive and anti-competitive activities and policies
33
could equally be pursued by a local government.
The three person dissent argued that the issue to be analyzed was
really a question of preemption of local government power by federal
statutes under the Supremacy Clause. The dissent found that there was
no preemptive intent in the antitrust acts. 34 The three dissenters also
argued that home ruled municipalities must be allowed to undertake
economic regulatory actions within their sphere of power and should
not be forced to return power to the state in order to be exempt from
the antitrust laws.
To summarize what appears to be the test today, the majority of
the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of a limited antitrust exemption for local governments. However, exemption exists only where
the municipality acts to further or implement a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy. The exemption may also require
that the municipality be subject to active state supervision. It is clear
that today the antitrust exposure of local governments is greater than it
was before City of Lafayette and City of Boulder. It is important to
note, however, that in neither case did the Court find actual antitrust
liability for the local government. According to the decisions, a cause
ject to active state supervision. The court in Boulder did not reach the issue of whether active state
supervision would be required before the exception for a local government would arise. See 455
U.S. at 51. n. 14. But, the Midcal decision, supra note 23, establishes such a requirement where a
private party is the defendant. The lower courts generally hold that no active state supervision, is
needed where the defendant is a public entity. See Town ofHallie v. City of Eau Claire,700 F.2d
376 (7th Cir. 1983) at 383-385 and Central Iowa Refuse System v. Des Moines Metro Solid Waste

Agency, 715
32. 455
33. Id.
34. Id.

F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983) at 428. But see text infra at pp. 75-76.
U.S. at 55.
at 55-56.
at 68-69.
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of action had been stated by the plaintiff, and a city could not interpose
a claim of exemption from the antitrust acts because of its status.
Neither case tells us what the appropriate remedies will be if a city is
found to be liable in antitrust, nor whether damages, attorney's fees or
costs will be assessed against the city in amounts equivalent to those
that winning plaintiffs in antitrust cases normally are granted.
PART

II

Recent Lower Court Cases Challenging Land Use Decisions as
Violations of the Antitrust Laws
Reduction by the Supreme Court in the antitrust exemption for
local governments has resulted in the filing of more than fifty antitrust
35
cases against local governments, challenging a wide variety of actions.
35. A list of cases prepared for the National Institute of Municipal Law Offices, distributed
by Robert J. Logan, City Attorney, San Jose, California and Chairman of NIMLO's Committee
on Antitrust Law and Municipalities (undated, but distributed in 1982), lists 44 cases divided into
the following areas: cable television regulation (six cases), land use and zoning (nine cases), waste
collection and disposal (two cases), hospital and ambulance services (two cases), water and sewage
systems (four cases), airport services and concessions (six cases), utility services (four cases), towing services (three cases), mass transit (one case), licenses and concessions (one case), land leasing
(one case) and contracts (one case). Since at least five additional land use and zoning cases, and
many other cases have been filed since 1982, the total is now well over 50 cases.
This article does not attempt to analyze the full development of antitrust doctrines in all topic
areas. For discussions of various aspects of the antitrust/local government issues not covered in
this article, see Levin, The Antitrust Challenge to Local Government Protection of the Central Business District, 55 UNIV. OF COLORADO L. REV. 21 (1983); Freilich, Donovan and Rails, Antitrust
Liability and Preemption ofAuthority." Trends and Developments in Urban, State and Local Government Law, 15 URBAN LAWYER 705 (1983); Comment, Municipal Government Exemption from Federal Antitrust Laws, 40 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 143 (1983); Casenote, Municipalities' Increased
Susceptibility to Antitrust Liability. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 24 BosTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1399 (1983); Conant, The Supremacy Clause and State Economic Controls.The Antitrust Maze, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 255 (1983); James, Municipal Defenses to Antitrust
Liability, 6 UNIV. OF ARK. AT LITTLE ROCK L.J. 273 (1983); Lester, MunicipalAntitrust Liability
After Boulder, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 827 (1983); Pauerstein, Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston;
Local Governments and Antitrust Immunity, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 791 (1983); Note, Recent Develop.
ment-Municipalities and the Antitrust Laws. Home Rule Authority is Insufficient to Ensure State
Action Immunity, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1982); Comment, Alternative Approaches to Municipal
Antitrust Liability, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 51 (1982); Hartford, Antitrust and Zoning - How
Much Respectfor Local Government?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901 (1982); Antitrust Symposium:
MunicipalAntitrust Liability, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245-431 (1980); Note, Antitrust Law-Municipal
Immunity-Application of the State Action Doctrine to Municipalities, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 570; Note,
The Application of Antitrust Laws to MunicipalActivities, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 518 (1979); Payne,
Recent Changes in Federal Law - Antitrust and Zoning, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 146 (1982); Rose,
Municipal Activities and the Antitrust Laws After City of Lafayette, 57 U. DET. J.URB. L. 482
(1980); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435
(1981); Comment, Antitrust Laws, Zoning and Agreements to Zone: Delegation of Police Powers
After Lafayette v. Louisana Power & Light, 25 S.DAK. L. REV. 314 (1981); Note, MunicipalLiability For Refusing to Zone for Outlying Development, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 485 (1981); Note, State
Action-Home Rule Municipality's Ordinances Not Exempt from Sherman Act, 12 SETON HALL. L.
REV. 835 (1982).
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This part will not analyze all of the cases but will look at a series of
land use related cases.
Before looking specifically at the antitrust challenges, it is important to review some "black letter" zoning principles. Zoning enabling
acts do not authorize the use of zoning ordinances to control competition as a direct purpose or goal of a zoning ordinance. 36 As a result,
when the state courts read an ordinance as trying to directly control
competition, the ordinance is routinely voided at the state level on pure
zoning grounds. 37 However, zoning, by its very nature, by establishing
limited uses and by creating the basic division of uses into residential,
commercial and other zones, affects competition and often even creates
monopolies without violating standard zoning doctrines. 38 Some cases
have held that a refusal to rezone for additional uses, such as a new
shopping center or other commercial use, was valid under zoning laws
community
because of the need to preserve the economic health of the
39
power.
police
the
of
aspect
welfare
general
or under the
Until very recently, the challenges to zoning and land use ordinances have been couched in traditional zoning and police power
terms. They have not included antitrust challenges, just as they have
40 It
not included other federal claims such as Section 1983 challenges.
is possible that an ordinance which is valid as a zoning or land use
ordinance will be found to violate the antitrust laws. 4' However, while
it may be theoretically possible for a zoning ordinance to be both valid
and a violation of the antitrust laws, this article will argue that there
42
should not be many cases where the combination actually occurs.
In order to analyze why valid police power ordinances should
rarely, if ever, be found to be antitrust violations, it will be helpful to
analyze the existing federal antitrust attacks on local land use decisions.
Of the land use related cases this article will analyze, eight cases relate
36. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, 2D. § 7.28 (1977) [hereinafter cited as R.
ANDERSON]; D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.29 (1982) [hereinafter cited as D. MANDELKER].
See also Levin, supra, at 71-76.
37. I R. ANDERSON, supra note 35, § 7.28; D. MANDELKER, supra note 35, § 5.29.
38. D. MANDELKER, supra note 35, §§ 5.32, 5.33.

39. Id.
40. The leading work on § 1983 liability is S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO § 1983 (1979 & Supp. 1982) See chapter six for an analysis of local
government liability, especially § 6.07 and § 6.08. Examples of § 1983 challenges to zoning and
land use activities of local governments include Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir.
1978), and Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.)reh'gdenied, 649 F.2d 336 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982).
41. See Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacatedand remanded, 435 U.S.
992 (1978), opin. reinstated,576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a valid zoning ordinance could violate the antitrust laws.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
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to land rezoning, four are urban redevelopment project cases, one concerns a city's aggressive attempt to try to block the development of a
shopping center competitive with its new downtown center by using
federal and state environmental statutes, and by filing actions with federal and state administrative agencies, and several others deal with cap43
ital improvement controls used to control land development.
A.

Zoning Decisions

Three of the rezoning cases deal with essentially identical circumstances. 44 A developer hopes to develop a shopping center. Either the
developer is refused the rezoning needed to construct the shopping
center or, after successfully applying for rezoning, a developer discovers that a competitor has also been granted rezoning. The plaintiff developer claims that there is an antitrust violation in either the refusal to
rezone or in the granting of rezoning to the competitor.
As a zoning case, this type of case is quite common.4 5 Proponents
of a large new commercial center often are turned down for rezoning.
The developer challenges the decision on grounds relating to master
planning, 46 spot zoning issues, 47 due process issues, 48 and other
grounds. 49 What makes the antitrust cases different is the same element
that makes a § 1983 or a federal "taking" case different. The plaintiff
wants not just its rezoning or to block its competitor's rezoning, but
also substantial damages. For example, in Scott v. City of Sioux City,50
43. For a general analysis of the use of capital improvement controls as land use control
devices, see Deutsch, CapitalImprovement Controls as Land Use ControlDevices, 9 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 61 (1978).
44. Scott v. City of Sioux City, 1983-1 Trade Cas. 65,352 (N.D. Iowa 1983); Westborough
Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, 1982-2 Trade Cas. 64,931 (E.D. Mo. 1981)ajfdinpartandrev'd
inpart, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982); Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F.
Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affid in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
45. See, e.g., Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, 68 Cal. App. 3d
467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804
(1969). See generally, ELLICKSON AND TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 83-85 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ELLICKSON & TARLOCK]; Weaver and Duerksen, Central
Business District Planning and the Control of Outlying Shopping Centers, 14 URB. L. ANN. 57
(1977); D. MANDELKER supra note 35, §§ 5.29-5.33.
46. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 35, at 57-64. See also Mandelker, The Role of the Local
Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976).
47. Spot zoning means the singling out of a parcel of land for treatment different from that
given to surrounding parcels. For an analysis of spot zoning see ELLICKSON AND TARLOCK, supra
note 43 at 241-44.
48. See ELLICKSON AND TARLOCK, supra note 43 at 63-75, 79-86, & 281-313.
49. Other grounds can include improper fiscal purposes and interference with first amendment rights. See, e.g., Mindel v. Township Council of Township of Franklin, 167 N.J. Super. 461,
400 A.2d 1244 (1979); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), reh'g denied,
429 U.S. 873 (1976).
50. 1983-1 Trade Cas. 65,362 (N.D. Iowa 1983).
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the disappointed prospective developer sued a small city for fifteen million dollars in damages. 5 1 In Westborough Mall v. The City of Cape
Girardeau,5 2 plaintiffs asked for $180 million because a competitor's
land was also rezoned for a shopping center. In Mason City Center
Associates v. The City of Mason City, 53 no specific dollar amount was
requested but the plaintiffs alleged that they had lost approximately
fourteen million dollars as a result of the city's actions, an amount
which would be trebled under traditional antitrust law.
Both Mason City and Westborough Mall are cases to be analyzed
in detail. Mason City will be analyzed first. Mason City is one of only
two cases involving municipal land use control and antitrust in which
54
there has actually been a trial.
Mason City Associates hoped to develop a shopping center approximately three miles from downtown Mason City. The city refused
to rezone the proposed development site from agriculture to the appropriate business district. The plaintiffs alleged that the city, the city
council members, and the developers of a downtown shopping center
presently under development and strongly supported by the city had
combined and conspired to unreasonably restrain trade, had created an
illegal group boycott and had illegally attempted to monopolize the relevant shopping center market. 55
Among the improper activities alleged by the plaintiffs was a claim
that the city and the downtown center developer had entered into a
contract which provided that the city would not rezone any land to
allow a shopping center in competition with the downtown center.
Further, plaintiffs alleged that the city had executed a written contract
with the downtown center developer which in effect gave the developer
a veto over rezoning to commercialize any land in the city. The city
promised not to rezone any land in conflict with the comprehensive
plan which called for only a downtown shopping center in Mason City.
In 1979, after City of Lafayette, but before City of Boulder, the
district court held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action. The
court rejected a Parkerv. Brown exemption claim. Using the test stated
51. In 1980, the population of Sioux City, Iowa was 82,003 according to the United States
Census.
52. 1982-2 Trade Cas. 64,931 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd in part and rey'd in part, 693 F.2d 733
(8th Cir. 1982).
53. 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
54. The trial in Mason City was held in 1981. See Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of
Mason City, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982). The other case is Unity Ventures v. County of Lake,
No. 81 C2745 (N.D. Ill. 1984), in which trial was held in January, 1984.
55. Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. at 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
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in Lafayette, the court found that the Iowa Zoning Enabling Act 56 did
not reflect a policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly service, and that Iowa did not require a monopoly or clearly articulate an anti-competitive policy. At most, Iowa law was neutral
concerning anti-competitive land use planning by its cities. Finally, the
district court found that local zoning was not actively supervised by the
state of Iowa. 7 Thus, the district court found that on every prong of
the Lafayette test, Mason City lost, and did not qualify for an exemption from the antitrust laws.
The defendants also contended that no antitrust cause of action
was stated because of the right to petition government exemption reflected in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 58 The defendants claimed
that the developer exercised its free speech rights to convince the city
not to rezone. The district court held that attempts to secure or block
legislation are quite different from entering into a contract to prevent
competition and block plaintiffs meaningful access to zoning procedures and mechanisms. The court held that whenever there is a municipality/developer contract, there is no longer a free speech or right to
petition issue. Instead, there is an act which could violate the antitrust
laws. The court ordered the case to proceed on the merits, and the case
promptly went to trial.
A jury trial was held in 1981 and the jury found no liability under
the antitrust laws. At the trial, all the members of the city council testified. 59 They explained that they had voted to deny the rezoning because they felt that the downtown area rather than an outlying area
should be developed, and that downtown development was better and
healthier for the city. The city officials also testified that they voted to
deny the rezoning because the comprehensive plan, which had been
revised in 1965 long before this controversy, had called for a downtown
shopping center and no outlying shopping center. They testified that
the contract had not entered into their consideration of whether to vote
against the rezoning.
The city had counterclaimed against plaintiffs, claiming that the
antitrust action was an intentional interference with the business relationship between the city and the downtown developer. The city asked
56.

IOWA CODE § 414 (1981).

57. 468 F. Supp. at 743.
58.

See supra note 15.

59. Testimony by city officials concerning their motives for voting is rare. See Ely, Legislative
andAdministrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT.
REV. 95.
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for more than one million dollars in damages. The jury found in favor
of the city on the counterclaim and granted a quarter of a million dol60
lars in damages against the plaintiff, as well as attorneys' fees.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury decision of
no liability, agreeing that the defendant's officials testimony could be
relied upon by the jury. However, the court reversed the counterclaim
award, finding that the award reflected highly speculative damages to
the city and hence was unsupportable under Iowa law. 6 1 The award
against the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees was also reversed.
Mason City thus supports the ability of a rejected developer to
challenge local zoning decisions but shows that the right to sue does not
necessarily mean the ability to prevail. However, neither is a counterclaim by a city likely to be successful. Because Mason City was acting
as a regulator and not as a developer or for the benefit of specific individuals, the result of no liability is consistent with the proposals made
in Part III of this article. Further, since Mason City was not alleged to
be a marketplace actor, or acting corruptly, the city should have been
granted an exemption from the antitrust laws and should not have been
62
forced to trial.
Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau63 is a suit by one potential shopping center developer against the city which rezoned a second parcel for a competitive center. Apparently, everyone agreed that
only one center could be sustained in the town. The plaintiff's land had
been rezoned by the city several years earlier but the developer had
been unable to attract major tenants and had delayed the project. Although some work was done on the site, no real construction had occurred. At the time the second parcel was rezoned, the city manager
announced that the rezoning of plaintiff's parcel had lapsed due to disuse in accordance with the normal zoning practice of the city. In fact,
the plaintiffs rezoning had not lapsed because the rezoning ordinance
had specifically stated it would not.
The plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize the shopping center market in the region. The plaintiff also
60. This result offers a warning to plaintiffs' attorneys. It is possible to be found liable for
damages in a counterclaim or for attorney's fees for bringing a frivolous lawsuit or one without
merit. In Tatum v. Regents of Nebraska-Lincoln, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (June 13, 1983), the United
States Supreme Court has recently assessed attorney's fees against a plaintiff for a frivolous appeal. This decision is likely to encourage lower courts to take similar action.
61. 671 F.2d at 1150.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
63. 1982-2 Trade Cas. 64,931 (E.D. Mo. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part 693 F.2d 733
(8th Cir. 1982).
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claimed various improper secret contacts and agreements between the
city, city officials and the other developers, including a trade of some of
the developer's land in exchange for the rezoning. The district court
granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment, holding that
there was no evidence of monopolization or anti-competitive action,
and no basis for the plaintiff to attempt to prove its allegations.
Concerning the antitrust immunity claim of the city, the district
court held there was an exemption for the city under Parker v. Brown
because the city ordinance was passed under a state enabling act. Unfortunately, although deciding the case in 1981, the district court made
no reference to City of Lafayette or the other recent cases changing the
antitrust exemption and did not apply the test developed in these cases.
The district court also found the Noerr-Pennington immunity.
64
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.
The court held that the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to thwart the
normal zoning procedures of the city, and that such a conspiracy, if
proved, would not further any articulated state policy. Further, the
court decided there was no Noerr-Pennington immunity because the
plaintiffs alleged not just petitioning of the government by the defendants but also that the defendants had engaged in illegal or fraudulent
65
actions to revert the plaintiffs zoning.
Of course, the reversal does not find liability, but it does offer the
plaintiff the chance to prove its claims in a situation where the plaintiff
probably could not go ahead with the project due to its own
problems. 66 The plaintiff did allege, however, that the city was acting
67
in the marketplace.
In Scott v. Sioux City, the district court refused to grant summary
judgment for the city on the basis of the exemption. The court read
City of Boulder and City of Lafayette to require a state mandate for
anti-competitive behavior, a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy and active supervision by the states of the local
government's activities. 68 Lacking any of these elements, a defense of
immunity must fail, according to the court. The decision appears to be
64. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982).
65. Id. at 746.
66. See 1982-2 Trade Cas. 64,931 at p. 72763.
67. 1983-1 Trade Cas. 65, 352 (N.D. Iowa, 1983). This opinion concerns a defense that the
redevelopment statutes of Iowa provide an exemption to the city, and so this case could appear in
the next subpart of the article. The court followed a similar analysis on the question of zoning,
however.
68. While the District Court found that active supervision by the state was required, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gold Cross Ambulance and Transfer and Stand-by Service v.
City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (1983) and in Central Iowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines
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more demanding of a city and of state statutes than several of the other
decisions which are analyzed in this part of the article. The court's
decision to read the Supreme Court opinions to require a three element
test before an exemption will be granted would sharply reduce the possibility of a city avoiding the pre-trial and trial expenses which are of
major concern to municipalities. Thus, Westborough Mall, Mason City
and Sioux City demonstrate that the local antitrust exemption will be
interpreted narrowly in land use related situations. Where zoning ordinances depend upon a typical state enabling act, the requirement for
exemption that there be a clearly articulated state policy against competition will not be satisfied. However, although a city will have to
defend its actions, Mason City was able to do so based upon its master
plan and reasonable zoning based criteria for decision.
Three of the other zoning cases allege that downzoning was carried out by the defendant city in violation of the antitrust laws. In
Stauffer v. Town of GrandLake,69 the town rezoned the plaintiff's land
from multi-family to single family. The plaintiff had challenged the
action twice in state court but the cases had been dismissed. Despite
that fact, the plaintiff was held to have stated a cause of action in federal court alleging a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade by
preventing him from competing in the sales market for multi-family
70
residential units.
In an interesting opinion, the court stated that the Lafayette test
was improperly applied in the original Mason City trial court opinion,
although both cases held that no exemption existed. The district court
found that a state need only have authorized municipal action and
7
need not have commanded the action to qualify for the exemption. '
The court found that the Colorado zoning statute, while quite similar
to Iowa's, evidenced a state policy to displace competition and that the
state had a sufficiently active role in supervising the policy. No de72
tailed legislative authorization is needed for the city to act.
However, the court still held that no exemption existed. Although
the Lafayette test was satisfied, the plaintiff had alleged that the city
went beyond the scope of its immunity. The plaintiff claimed that city
officials owned land benefitted by the rezoning which had injured him.
Metro Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419 (1983) has held that active state supervision is not required for a municipality to qualify for the exemption.
69. 1981-1 Trade Cas. 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980).
70. Id. at 76328-76331.
71. Accord, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983) at 381-382.
72. This holding is probably reversed by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Community Communications, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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The court held that this conduct was not authorized or contemplated by
the state legislature and was not immunized. Thus, while the city may
have broad discretion to be anticompetitive in the zoning ordinance, it
cannot claim an exemption if the zoning is for the economic benefit and
73
individual interests of city officials.
The Stauffer case also holds that a wholly local business can affect
interstate commerce, even indirectly, and will satisfy the Sherman Act
requirement of injury to interstate commerce. In Stauffer, the interstate effects were on out of state purchasers of property and out of state
financiers of the purchasers.
Nelson v. Utah County,74 involves a similar issue of rezoning of
land. In Nelson, the issues were resolved in a manner similar to that in
Stauffer, to hold that a cause of action has been stated. As in Stauffer,
the plaintiff alleged that defendant local officials benefitted directly
from the rezoning.
The third downzoning case is Brown v. Carr,75 involving the
Washington, D.C. Zoning Commission and private parties. The district court allowed the case to proceed on the theory that a publicity
campaign to change the zoning was merely a sham to hide a conspiracy
under the Sherman Act. The court found that the conspiracy allegation
took the case out of both the Parker exemption and the Noerr-Pennington immunity.
These three downzoning cases establish an important concept for
local government antitrust immunity. In all three cases, the plaintiffs
claimed that the rezoning decision was made for the benefit of individual city officials rather than for the benefit of the municipality. In
Stauffer, the district court found immunity to exist for general zoning
by the city, but allowed the case to proceed because of the existence of
a claim of action for the benefit of individual officials. This article will
argue that self-dealing should be one of only two bases for finding local
government antitrust liability. 76 Further, the ordinances which reflect
77
self-dealing should also be invalid as zoning ordinances.
73. A similar analysis can be found in Cedar-Riverside Assoc. v. U.S., 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D.
Minn. 1978), af'd on other grounds sub non., Cedar-Riverside Assoc. v. City of Minneapolis, 606
F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979). See infra text accompanying notes 77-79. It is the argument of this
article that antitrust liability should only be held against a municipality when private individuals
or officials are individually benefitted by the city actions or when the city acts as a developer. See
infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
74. 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,128 (D. Utah 1977).
75. 1980-1 Trade Cas. 63,033 (D.D.C. 1979).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
77. See J. GARDINER AND T. LYMAN, DECISIONS FOR SALE: CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN
LAND USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1978).
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In Ossler v. Village of Norridge7 8 plaintiff expended well over one
million dollars to purchase land for a multiple family condominium
project after consulting with local officials. The land was zoned single
family, but plaintiff alleged he was assured by the members of the village board that it would be rezoned to allow the project. The board
then refused to rezone the land after public opposition developed, and
plaintiff lost the land through foreclosure. The rezoning later was
granted to the mortgage lender. In a short opinion, the Court dismissed the antitrust claim on the merits, finding that there had been no
allegation by plaintiff of anticompetitive motives or anticompetitive
consequences. The Court failed to mention the local government exemption in the opinion. However, without a claim by plaintiff of selfdealing or action for the benefit of private individuals in the complaint,
the decision is consistent with the analysis proposed in this article.
The final zoning case this article will review is an interesting one.
In Whitworth v. Perkins,79 the defendant was the town of Impact,
Texas, a town formed for the purpose of selling liquor adjacent to dry
Abilene and within dry Jackson County. The plaintiff's property was
zoned as residential, although the plaintiff ran a food market. The
plaintiff was refused the right to sell liquor on his property. He claimed
that the town, the alderpeople, the town developer and others had conspired to violate the antitrust laws by limiting competition and by monopolization. The district court held the zoning ordinance to be valid
and dismissed the antitrust challenge on the basis that a valid zoning
ordinance limited the plaintiffs use, and that there was no illegal conspiracy. The circuit court reversed, finding:
The mere presence of the zoning ordinance does not necessarily insulate the defendants from antitrust liability where, as here, the plaintiff asserts that the enactment of the ordinance was itself a part of the
alleged conspiracy to restrain trade.8 0
The court continued that if the zoning ordinance was passed to
carry out the conspiracy to control competition in the sale of liquor in
Impact, and if a plaintiff can show that he was injured by the ordinance, then a cause of action has been stated even if the ordinance is
valid. Writing prior to the Lafayette case, the court also found that no
automatic antitrust exemption existed and that a cause of action could
lie against the city, although it left that decision to the district court.
78. 557 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ill., 1983).
79. 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), opin. reinstated,
576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978).
80. 559 F.2d at 379.
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Whitworth is significant for challengers of local land use controls
because it finds that a valid ordinance can be part of an illegal conspiracy under the antitrust laws. However, self-dealing is the basis of the
conspiracy and likely to be the only context in which such a finding
could be made. 8'
B.

Other Land Use Decisions

Land use regulation is accomplished by communities through urban redevelopment programs, capital improvement control systems
and other non-zoning methods. This section will look at antitrust challenges to non-zoning land use regulation. There are four cases relating
to redevelopment programs. In Schiessle v. Stephens ,82 the redevelopment plan of the city of Rosemont called for the plaintiff's property to
be "taken," although the property was used for several businesses. The
plaintiff claimed that the plan was a "sham" and designed to allow her
property to be taken to be sold to another developer as part of a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize trade. In a well reasoned
opinion, the district court held that under Lafayette and related cases,
there was no state action exemption. The existence of the plan was not
enough to immunize the city if individual benefit was intended. This
finding is consistent with the proposal in part III of this article.
A second case, Cedar-RiversideAssociates v. United States,8 3 concerned a reduction in the number of units a developer could build.
Here, as in Stauffer, the court found that immunity would ordinarily
result from a redevelopment plan change. However, the court held that
the plaintiffs properly pleaded that Minneapolis exceeded its lawful
monopoly by conspiring with a private party to restrain competition.
Thus, the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action. 84 However, the court
doubted that the plaintiffs could prove their case or ultimately
85
prevail.
86
In Jonnet Development Corp. v. Caliguiri,
a plaintiff alleged that
the City of Pittsburgh, the Redevelopment Agency, public officials,
Conrail and private developers conspired to prevent the construction of
a potentially competing hotel outside the designated development area
in which a hotel was planned. The court dismissed the case by finding
81. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
82. 525 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. IU. 1981).
83. 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978), afrd on other grounds sub nom. Cedar-Riverside
Assoc. v. City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979).
84. Id. at 1299.
85. Id.
86. 558 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa., 1983).
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that the state legislation authorized anti-competitive behavior concerning land development.8 7 The court found that the redevelopment process was "in furtherance of a clearly articulated policy of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and private competition has been displaced. 88 Because the city was alleged only to be a regulator, the dismissal is proper under the proposal in Part III of the article.
Finally, in Richmond Hilton Associates v. The City of Richmond,89 a
competing developer sued the city and its officials for actively opposing
a proposed hotel which would compete with the hotel planned for a
major redevelopment project. Ultimately the case was settled without a
court determination of the existence of an exemption. However, since
the city was alleged only to be a regulator, a state action antitrust exemption would have been appropriately found by the court.
Another interesting case, properly decided, is Miracle Mile Associates v. City of Rochester.90 The plaintiff proposed to build a shopping
center in the town of Henrietta, New York, a suburb of Rochester.
Rochester, in the process of developing a downtown shopping center,
aggressively opposed the new center. As Rochester could not refuse to
rezone or directly affect the decisions of its suburb, the city, either directly or through individuals, filed a series of requests with the New
York Department of Environmental Conservation to apply the State
Environmental Quality Review Act 9' and the Freshwater Wetlands
Act. 92 Rochester also filed requests with the United States Army Corps
of Engineers to force plaintiffs to comply with federal statutes.9 3 The
plaintiffs claimed that all the applications were part of a "sham," not to
obtain the remedies requested, but to delay or block plaintiff's project.
Both the district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed that the city's activities were exempt under the antitrust laws
because the state and federal agencies did take jurisdiction and required plaintiffs to comply with the appropriate statutes. Also, Rochester had a strong interest in the economic health of its inner city, a valid
police power justification for its actions.
The district court held that the plaintiffs' suit was frivolous, and
87.
88.
89.
90.
(2d Cir.
91.

See 558 F, Supp. 962 at 965.
Id
No. CA81-11OOR (E.D. Va., 1981). For collateral opinions, see fn. 4, supra.
1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,735 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 617 F.2d 18
1980).
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (McKimney Supp. 1982-83).

92. Id. at § 24.
93. Miracle Mile Assoc. v. City of Rochester, 1979-2 Trade Cas.

62,735 at 78148.
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granted attorneys fees against plaintiff.94 The Second Circuit reversed
that finding, holding that even an unsuccessful court action, although
similar to a previous unsuccessful court action, was not frivolous. 95
Thus, an aggressive city did not fall afoul the anti-trust laws, while
a plaintiff who had lost a similar suit in the past did not suffer added
liability either. As there was no claim of self-dealing by the officials of
the city, and the city had valid police power reasons for its action, the
decision is a correct one.
Finally, a group of cases relate to a municipality's use of its sewer
system or other capital system to control land development. In Parks v.
Watson, 96 the City of Klamath Falls, Oregon refused to vacate a platted city street to allow development of an apartment complex unless
the developer deeded to the city land which contained geothermal
wells. The developer alleged that the requirement that it dedicate the
wells to the city was anti-competitive, because the city was developing
geothermal resources and created the condition of dedication to eliminate a potential competitor. In reversing the district court's granting of
summary judgment for the city, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the state had not clearly authorized "monopolistic control"
by the city. 97 Further, the court found that the city could not rely on an
immunity claim because it had not created the special district authorized by the state legislature. Finally, even if a monopoly were authorized, the city might not be immunized for an improper tying of a "nonmonopolized" product or service to the sale of the authorized
product. 98
In Vickery Manor Service Corporation v. Village of Mundelein,99
the plaintiffs were a privately owned sewage treatment facility and the
owner of developable land within the village. The plaintiffs alleged
that in order to get development permission for the land, the city would
require the land developer to acquire the privately owned facility, upgrade it, abandon its use for the development when the city extended its
service to the area, pay substantial fees to bear the cost of the sewer
extension and hook-ups, and operate the facility at a loss to provide
service to a small group of customers located outside the village. The
district court held that the village's claim of immunity could not prevail. The court rejected the argument that the state had clearly articu94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 78151.
617 F.2d at 21-22.
1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,632 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at p. 69209.
Id.
No. 82 C 5392, (N.D. Il. 1983).
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lated and affirmatively expressed a policy allowing a municipality to
create a monopoly over sewer service by tying land development permissions to the elimination of competitors. Instead, it found the relevant statutes to be neutral, authorizing sewage services but not anticompetitive activities.
Both Parks and Vickery Manor are consistent with the analysis
and proposal offered in Part III of this article. 100 In both cases, the city
was the owner of a public utility and was alleged to be a market place
actor trying to use land development controls to enhance its marketplace position. It is the thesis of this article that the antitrust laws
should apply to municipalities acting as developers or property owners
in the market place. However,. when the municipality acts as a regulator, it should not be liable under the antitrust laws.
The latter situation existed in a third capital improvement case,
Unity Ventures v. County of Lake. 10 1 Unity Ventures is the second antitrust case against a municipality to go to trial, and the first case in
which the local government lost at trial.' 0 2 The plaintiffs were attempting to develop a large tract of land originally under county jurisdiction.
The development could only proceed after annexation to one of the
cities located near the land. After extended negotiations, the developer
chose to annex to the Village of Round Lake Park. Although their land
was now a part of Round Lake Park, the developers discovered that a
nearby village, named Grayslake, had a contract with Lake County, the
county in which the property was located, to allow Grayslake to veto
sewer connections from the developer's property to the county sewer
system. Only the county sewer system could serve the development.
Grayslake exercised its veto power, and successfully opposed plaintiff's
application to the state for a permit to build its own sewage treatment
facility. As a result, the development could not proceed and the Village
of Grayslake preserved the sewage capacity for potential land developments within its boundaries.
In rejecting defendant's claim of municipal immunity, the court
followed the Vickery Manor decision and found that the village was not
expressly authorized to carry out the anti-competitive activity of protecting its own developable land at the expense of other communities.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
101. No. 81 C 2745, (N.D. I11.). The jury decision was rendered on Jan. 13, 1984. See Chicago
Tribune, January 14, 1984, p.5 and February 2, 1984, Metropolitan Section, p. 7.
102. The jury granted 9.5 million dollars in damages, which were trebled to 28.5 million dollars. The defendants have filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a
reduction in the amount of the damages. They are likely to appeal if neither of the motions are
granted. Interview with Alan Mills, attorney for plaintiffs, Feb. 1, 1984.
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Since the village lacked state authorization, it could not rely on a claim
of immunity from the antitrust laws. 10 3 As a result, the court ordered
the case to trial, which resulted in the jury's finding for plaintiffs.
This decision does not fit into the proposal for liability asserted in
this article. While the village's actions perhaps should have been invalid as a land use control matter,' 0 4 the city was acting as a regulator, not
as an owner or for the benefit of specific individuals. As a result, the
antitrust laws ought not be available against the community, although
a challenge based on basic land use and equity principles would be
appropriate.
To summarize the results of the litigation concerning the local antitrust exemption, several points seem to be established. There is still a
state action exemption for local governments from the antitrust laws.
However, the exemption is sharply limited compared to what it was
believed to be a few years ago. Cities are being sued for many actions,
including for their land use and zoning actions. The courts have now
developed a test for antitrust immunity that is likely to allow many
plaintiffs in land use related cases to avoid dismissal on immunity
grounds. Only one case has actually found liability, however. The
next part of this article will argue that cities should be able to defeat
many actions through the exemption, and that cities are not violating
the antitrust laws in most land use actions. 105 A plaintiff should have to
allege that there are acts by the city or its officials to benefit city officials
or private people, or that the city is a marketplace actor in order to
overcome a claim of municipal antitrust exemption.
PART III

Some Thoughts About When Antitrust Liability Should be Found

10

6

This article has reviewed the recent antitrust challenges to local government zoning and land use decisions. The cases represent attacks on
standard local land use decisions which usually are analyzed for validity under traditional police power concepts. In most cases, the local
government is regulating private decisionmaking, sometimes by choosSee Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, December 14, 1983.
See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
It is not the purpose of this article to review the antitrust laws of the United States or to
the component concepts. The concepts are complicated and the literature analyzing the
and cases is extensive. Recent works reviewing the antitrust laws include E. KINTER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW (1980); A. NEAL AND D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (3d ed. 1980); J. VAN CISE AND LIFLAND, UNDERSTANDING THE
ANTITRUST LAWS (8th ed. 1980); P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1980).
103.
104.
105.
106.
analyze
statutes
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ing among individual developers where all projects cannot or should
not be authorized. Where traditional land use control decisions are
made by the local government, the antitrust laws do not offer an appropriate framework for analyzing the validity of the local government
police power decisions. When a city council decides that a particular
parcel of land is best developed for residential rather than commercial
purposes, or decides that single family rather than multi-family housing is more desirable for a site, it is making a judgment which should
07
be based on the public health, safety and welfare of the community. 1
The decision should be based on the needs and desires of the residents
of the community, expressed generally through the political decision
process or particularly through the public hearing process required for
08
virtually all significant land use control decisions.1
In addition to the political aspect of the process, the decision
should be based on the professional planning process which is utilized
to varying degrees by municipalities all over the country. 0 9 The decision should recognize the goals of good planning and reflect fairness
between the subject-site's permitted land use, similarly situated sites,
and neighboring, affected uses of land."10
Of course, overriding national, state and regional needs and standards should be used to review and invalidate particular land use decisions and even the entire land use control schemes of communities.
Racially and economically exclusionary ordinances should be overruled."' Environmentally destructive local decisions should be overturned."t 2 Individual decisions which are irrational or unfair should be
107. This is the standard statement of the police power of the community. It was expressed as
early as 1926 by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), in which the Court approved the concept of zoning. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, 177-92 (1974) [hereinafter cited as N. WILLLIAMS].
108. A public hearing is required at least once during the consideration of zoning ordinance

amendments, during the consideration of applications for variances or special exceptions, and for
most applications for modem flexibility devices. The requirement was written into the Standard
Zoning Enabling Act (United States Dept. of Commerce, 1926) which has been the basis for all
state zoning enabling acts, and has been routinely required ever since. See 7 P. ROHAN, ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS, 51-46 through 51-56 (1981) [hereinafter cited as P. ROHAN].
109. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 35 at 49-66 and the books and articles cited therein. See
also ELLICKSON AND TARLOCK, supra note 43 at 361-412; N. WILLIAMS supra note 97 at 20-26.
110. See ELLICKSON AND TARLOCK, supra note 43 at 363-69. See Kmiec, DeregulatingLand

Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 40-46 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Kmiec].
11. The literature concerning exclusionary zoning is voluminous. Many of the leading works
are cited in D. MANDELKER, supra note 35 at 221-23. See also I P. ROHAN, supra note 98 at 2-1
through 3-278.
112. The literature concerning environmental aspects of land use control is also extensive.
Leading works are cited in D. MANDELKER, supra note 35 at 335. See also 4 P. ROHAN, supra
note 98 at 24-1 through 28-127.
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subject to challenge and should be voided by the courts." 3
The present state of land use litigation is troublesome in many jurisdictions. Inconsistent and unfair decisions are made by local governments, often without challenge by property owners because of the
costs of litigation and delay.' 14 Where challenges are made, a presumption of validity often protects the local decision where it ought to
be invalidated.'1 15 The list of persuasive criticisms of land use decisions
and doctrines is long and disturbing. A major rethinking of important
doctrines and practices of the land use control process is taking place,
and is much needed."

6

However, the antitrust laws do not provide a useful or appropriate
context for the land use reforms which are needed. The antitrust laws
ask a series of questions about economic decisionmaking, and the impact on markets or marketplace decisions. While local governments
are economic actors in some aspect of their existence, the land use control process is one where the local government is acting not as an economic entity but as a regulator of the private decision process. The
particular local government may be a good or bad regulator. Its decisions should be subject to review based on concepts of equity, due process and rationality appropriate for the regulatory function which it is
carrying out. The framework for analysis for the antitrust laws does
not fit the needs of such a review process. Thus, where the allegations
of the plaintiff relate to regulatory activities, the antitrust laws should
not apply. An exemption should be found by the court early in the
process, to reduce the economic impact of the antitrust defense otherwise required.
However, the antitrust laws should be applied to two aspects of the
local government land use control process because the regulatory function is not always carried out by a local government to the exclusion of
market place activities. In some circumstances, local governments act
as developers, or at least as partners of developers, in the land develop113. See generally ELLICKSON AND TARLOCK, supra note 43 at chs. 2 and 3. See also Kmiec,
supra note 100 at 40-46.
114. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME, at 89-100 (1966). See also B. SIEGAN, LAND USE
WITHOUT ZONING at 17-18 (1972) [hereinafter cited as B. SIEGAN]; Thurow and Vranicar, Procedural Reform of Local Land Use Regulation, LAND USE ISSUES OF THE 1980s at 191-95 (J. Carr
and E. Duensing ed. 1983).
115. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 35 at § 25.26.
116. Recent extensive criticisms of the zoning system include B. SIEGAN, supra note 98; Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls.: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977);
Kmiec, supra note 94; Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980); C. Rose,
Planningand Dealing PiecemealLand Use Controlsas a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 837 (1983).

ANTITRUST CHALLENGES

ment process. 117 They become involved in the development or redevelopment of parts of the community, providing money and land use
permissions as required. Sometimes, they own or receive a share of the
profits of the enterprise in which they have participated. Where the
city takes on the development role and exercise its land use powers as
part of its development role, it is a market place actor. As such, it
should be subject to the standards of behavior required by the antitrust
laws.
Second, corruption, improper influence for the benefit of private
individuals, and official's self-dealing unfortunately are endemic and
epidemic in local government land use regulation. 1 8 Indeed, an official's self-dealing or decision to benefit particular private individuals
was alleged in several of the reviewed antitrust challenges. 119 It was
claimed that the public land use control process had been captured for
private profit making and was not being exercised for the public welfare. The municipality had been turned into a private actor, protecting
or providing assistance for the economic activities of particular individuals at the expense of other individuals. The local government actions
were for the purpose of benefitting the individuals rather than for the
purpose of protecting the general welfare.
It is these cases that appear most appropriate for antitrust challenges. Private economic goals are being pursued by the public entity,
and being pursued inappropriately. Regardless of the apparent merit
of the land use decision as a land use decision, the antitrust framework
should be available to review the activities of the local government captured for private benefit.
Assuming that antitrust liability is found in one of these two circumstances, what should be the appropriate remedy? Ordinarily,
treble damages as punitive damages are available to a successful antitrust plaintiff. However, it is not common to grant punitive damages
against a municipality because of the burden placed on the taxpayers.' 20 In the situation where the municipality's land use control decisions have been made for private benefit, however, punitive damages
117. See Cedar-Riverside Assoc. v. U.S., 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978), afd on other
grounds sub nom. Cedar-Riverside Assoc. v. City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979);
Parks P. Watson, 1983-2 Trade Cas. 65, 632 (9th Cir. 1983).
118. See J. GARDINER AND T. LYMAN, DECISIONS FOR SALE: CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN
LAND-USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1978).

119. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435
U.S. 992 (1978),opin. reinstated, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Carr, 1980-1 Trade Cas.
63,033 (D.D.C. 1979); Nelson v. Utah County, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,128 (D.D.C. 1979); Stauffer
v. Town of Grand Lake, 198 1-1 Trade Cas. 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980).
120. The United States Supreme Court in County of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S.
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ought to be granted because the exercise of police power for private
gain represents a substantial abuse of power.
Treble damages should not be granted where the local government
acts as a developer. The activity is for a public purpose and benefit
even if tactics chosen may violate the antitrust laws. As a result, the
injured party should be limited to recovery of actual damages. Where
the violations of the antitrust laws include self-dealing as well, however, treble damages should be granted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although antitrust causes of action have been asserted for a variety of zoning and planning decisions, the antitrust laws are not appropriate for testing the validity of most land use decisions. Instead, police
power principles, modified to eliminate some of the existing flaws and
inequities, should test local land use decisions.
For most land use related antitrust litigation, where the challenge
is to the community's regulatory activities, the court should recognize
the Parkerv. Brown exemption early in the litigation process. By granting an early motion to dismiss, the court will allow the municipality to
avoid most of the expenses of defending an antitrust action. Only
where the municipality is alleged to be acting as a development partner, or acting for the economic benefit of government officials or private individuals, should the lawsuit proceed and the antitrust laws be
applicable. Even where antitrust laws are applicable and are found to
have been violated, only in the case of official self-dealing or municipal
action for the benefit of private individuals should traditional treble
damages be imposed on municipalities.

247 (1981) refused to authorize punitive damages against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court stated:
By the time Congress enacted . . . § 1983, the immunity of a municipal corporation
from punitive damages at common law was not open to serious question. It was generally understood by 1871 that a municipality . . .

was . . .

subject to suit for a wide

range of tortious activity, but this understanding did not extend to the award of punitive
or exemplary damages. . . Judicial disinclination to award punitive damages against a
municipality has persisted to the present day in the vast majority of jurisdictions.
Id. at 259-60 (footnotes omitted).
Of course, it may take an amendment to the antitrust laws to avoid treble damages against
municipalities, given the present language of the damages provision.

